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THE ENIGMA OF WYNNE
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY
ABSTRACT
The five-justice Wynne majority used that case to make a
major statement about the dormant Commerce Clause. In many
respects, Wynne is an enigma that perpetuates an inherent
problem of the Courts dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the 
Court declares some ill-defined taxes as unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory because they encourage in-state investment, while
other economically equivalent taxes and government programs
that similarly encourage intrastate economicactivity are appar-
entlyacceptable under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Wynne is thus more important than the immediate situation it
addresses, and willhave consequences beyond the immediate cir-
cumstances it addresses. A decision as enigmaticas it is impor-
tant, Wynne raises as manyquestions as it answers. Among these
are the continuing viabilityofexternalconsistencyand apportion-
ment, concepts that have been central to the Courts formulation 
ofthe dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne also undermines the
Courts traditional tolerance of the double state income taxation 
ofdualresidents because such double taxation can encourage a
dualresident to undertake single-taxed in-state economicactivity
rather than make investments subject to suchdouble taxation.
Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law
at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
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INTRODUCTION
Marylands county income tax does not grant a credit to Mary-
land residents for the out-of-state income taxes such residents
pay on the income they earn outside of Maryland.1 In Comptroller
ofthe TreasuryofMaryland v. Wynne, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that this failure causes the Maryland county income tax to
violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2
This result, while important, is self-contained: the states personal 
income taxes generally extend credits to their respective residents
for the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay. Consequently,
such state income taxes already comply with Wynne.
Many local income taxes, like the Maryland county tax, do not
grant credits for income taxes paid out-of-state.3 However, while
local income taxes are important sources of municipal revenue in
particular parts of the country, most Americans are not subject
to a city or a county income tax, as were Mr. and Mrs. Wynne.4
On another level, Wynnes implications extend significantly 
beyond the particular facts of that case. Contrary to what this
Author had anticipated,5 the five-justice Wynne majority used
that case to make a major statement about the dormant Com-
merce Clause. In many respects, Wynne is an enigma that per-
petuates an inherent problem of the Courts dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine: the Court declares that some ill-defined taxes
are unconstitutionally discriminatory because such taxes encour-
age in-state investment, while other economically equivalent taxes
and government programs that similarly encourage intrastate
economic activity are apparently acceptable under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
1 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1792.
4 Id.
5 This Author had anticipated the analysis reflected in Justice Ginsburgs 
Wynne dissenting opinion which received the support of only three members
of the Court, Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia. See 135 S. Ct. at 1813
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Edward A. Zelinsky, Why Wynne Worries Me, 67
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 207, 211 (2014); Edward A. Zelinsky, Wynne and the
Double Taxation ofDualResidents, 73 ST. TAX NOTES 259 (2014).
800 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:797
Wynne is thus more important than the immediate situation it
addresses. Just as a mundane dispute over a minor presidential
appointment gave rise to the U.S. Supreme Courts seminal state-
ment of the power of judicial review,6 Wynne will have conse-
quences beyond the immediate circumstances it addresses. A
decision as enigmatic as it is important, Wynne raises as many
questions as it answers. Among these are the continuing viabil-
ity (or not) of external consistency and apportionment, concepts
that have been central to the Courts formulation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Wynne also undermines the Courts tradi-
tional tolerance of the double state income taxation of dual resi-
dents because such double taxation can encourage a dual resident
to undertake single-taxed, in-state economic activity rather than
make investments subject to such double taxation.
I. THE SUPREME COURTS WYNNE OPINION
Marylands county income tax provides no credit to resident 
taxpayers for the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay.7
The Wynnes, residents of Howard County, Maryland, had income
from an S-corporation that operates in thirty-nine states.8 In ac-
cordance with the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Rev-
enue Code,9 the Wynnes reported their share of the corporations 
out-of-state income on their Maryland state and county income
tax returns.10 The Wynnes received a credit on their Maryland
state tax return for the out-of-state taxes they paid on the income
earned by their S-corporation outside of Maryland.11 However, the
Wynnes received no credit against their Maryland county income
taxes for income taxes they paid to states other than Maryland.12
A five-justice majoritysustaining Marylands highest court, 
the Court of Appealsheld that the Maryland county income tax 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause by failing to grant the
6 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 179293 (describing the facts of the case). 
8 The Courts opinion says that the Wynnes S-corporation filed state 
income tax returns in 39 States. Id. at 1793.
9 Id. at 1793 n.1 (summarizing the operation of Subchapter S).
10 Id. at 1793.
11 Id.
12 Id.
2016] THE ENIGMA OF WYNNE 801
Wynnes a credit for the out-of-state income taxes that the Wynnes
paid.13 Justice Alitos opinion for the Wynne Court propounds
several themes. Among the most important is the analogy be-
tween the creditless Maryland county income tax and a tariff:
because there is no credit under Marylands county income tax 
for out-of-state income taxes, the Maryland county tax has the 
same economic effect as a state tariff, the quintessential evil tar-
geted by the dormant Commerce Clause.14 [T]he Maryland tax 
scheme, because it does not grant a credit against the county in-
come tax for residents out-of-state income tax payments, is tan-
tamount to a tariff on work done out of State.15
Justice Alito further reaffirmed the dormant Commerce
Clause principle of nondiscrimination, writing that the dormant 
Commerce Clause precludes States from discriminating between
transactions on the basis of some interstate element:16
[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within
the State. Nor may a State impose a tax which discriminates
against interstate commerce either by providing a direct com-
mercial advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate
commerce to the burden of multiple taxation.17
Justice Alitos Wynne opinion places its chief reliance not on
the Courts more recent dormant Commerce Clause cases, but
on J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,18 Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,19 and CentralGreyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey.20 Each of these earlier cases, Justice Alito wrote, struck 
down a state tax scheme that might have resulted in the double
taxation of income earned out of the State and that discriminated
in favor of intrastate over interstate economic activity.21 Justice
Alito also wrote, Marylands tax scheme is unconstitutional for 
similar reasons.22
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1792.
15 Id. at 180607. 
16 Id. at 1794 (internal citations omitted).
17 Id. (internal citations omitted).
18 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
19 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
20 Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
21 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.
22 Id.
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[T]he tax schemes held to be unconstitutional in J.D. Adams,
Gwin, White, and CentralGreyhound, had the potential to re-
sult in the discriminatory double taxation of income earned out
of state and created a powerful incentive to engage in intra-
state rather than interstate economic activity.23
Central to Justice Ginsburgs Wynne dissent24 are the argu-
ments that residents, like the Wynnes, benefit greatly from public
services.25 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg argues that such resi-
dents vote for the Maryland officials who impose the creditless
Maryland county income tax on the Wynnes.26 Consequently,
Justice Ginsburg argued, whether the Maryland county income
tax should (or should not) grant a credit for out-of-state income
taxes is a question of policy that should be decided through the
political process.27
In reply, Justice Alito pointed to the Courts dormant Com-
merce Clause cases protecting corporations from state income
taxes.28 [I]t is, he concluded, hard to see why the dormant 
Commerce Clause should treat individuals less favorably than
corporations.29
Like residents, corporations also benefit heavily from state 
and local services including roads, police and fire departments, 
and schools which help to attract and retain employees.30 Never-
theless, the dormant Commerce Clause constrains the states abil-
ity to tax these service-receiving corporations.
Justice Alito also rejected Justice Ginsburgs contention that 
the Wynnes do not need the protection of the dormant Commerce
Clause since, as Maryland residents, the Wynnes vote for the
Maryland officials who tax them: [I]f a States tax unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against interstate commerce, it is invalid
23 Id. at 180102. 
24 Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 1814.
26 Id. at 181415. 
27 Id. This Author had expected the Court to agree with the argument that
the Wynnes, as Maryland voters, were not entitled to dormant Commerce Clause
protection from the taxes levied on them by the officials for whom they vote.
See Zelinsky, WhyWynne Worries Me, supra note 5, at 21314. 
28 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.
29 Id. at 1797.
30 Id.
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regardless of whether the plaintiff is a resident voter or nonresi-
dent of the State.31
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito dismissed as fanciful32
the notion that the victims of such discrimination have a com-
plete remedy at the polls.33 The argument that the Wynnes can
protect themselves in Marylands political processes would leave 
no security where the majority of voters prefer protectionism at
the expense of the few who earn income interstate.34 Moreover,
large corporations headquartered in the State35 have political
influence but are nevertheless protected by the strictures of the
dormant Commerce Clause rather than consigned to their politi-
cal remedies.36
Justice Alitos Wynne opinion is thus a full-throated affirmation
that the dormant Commerce Clause constrains the states ability 
to tax their residents incomes. Justice Alito distinguished be-
tween the requirements of the Constitutions Due Process Clause 
and of the dormant Commerce Clause.37 The Due Process Clause
allows a state to tax all of its residents incomes.38 However, the
Commerce Clause constrains the states ability to tax its resi-
dents incomes. That is precisely the situation presented by 
Wynne: [T]he fact that a State has the jurisdictional power to
impose a tax [as a matter of Due Process] says nothing about
whether that tax violates the Commerce Clause.39
31 Id.




36 Justices Alito and Ginsburg also debated the significance (if any) of the
fact that the Maryland county income tax is a tax on net income, while the
taxes at issue in J.D. Adams, Gwin, and CentralGreyhound were taxes on
gross income. Compare id. at 179597 (Justice Alitos majority opinion reject-
ing that the Commerce Clause distinguishes between taxes on net and gross
income), with id. at 181920 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ([T]he Court has rou-
tinely maintained that the difference between taxes on net income and taxes 
on gross receipts from interstate commerce warrants different results under 
the Commerce Clause.) (citation omitted). 
37 Id. at 179899. 
38 Id. at 1798.
39 Id. at 1799.
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Also central to Justice Alitos Wynne opinion is the dormant
Commerce Clause test that has been denoted as internal consis-
tency.40 That test makes the theoretical assumption that every
state emulates the challenged law and then determines whether,
in that hypothetical setting, double taxation would occur from
that universally adopted law.41 This test
distinguish[es] between (1) tax schemes that inherently dis-
criminate against interstate commerce without regard to the
tax policies of other States, and (2) tax schemes that create
disparate incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and
sometimes result in double taxation) only as a result of the in-
teraction of two different but nondiscriminatory and inter-
nally consistent schemes. The first category of taxes is typically
unconstitutional; the second is not.42
The internal consistency test, Justice Alito wrote, proves that
Marylands tax scheme is inherently discriminatory and operates
as a tariff.43
According to Justice Alito, it is possible for the Maryland
county income tax to comply with the internal consistency test by
means other than a credit for out-of-state taxes.44 However, given
the Maryland county income tax in its present form, the absence
of a credit makes such county income tax unconstitutional.45
The majority in Wynne cut across conventional ideological
lines46 and agreed on the single opinion authored by Justice Alito.
In contrast, the Wynne dissenters were fragmented. In a dissenting
40 Id. at 1802.
41 Id.
42 Id. (internal citations omitted).
43 Id. at 1804.
44 Id. at 1806. As discussed later in this Article, creditless compliance with
the internal consistency test would require Maryland to forsake county in-
come taxation of nonresidents on their Maryland source income. See infra
Section II.E.
45 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180506. 
46 Justice Alitos Wynne opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. Id. at 1791. Professor Hellerstein
believes that Wynne reached the right result by requiring the jurisdiction of
residence to provide a credit for the income taxes paid to the jurisdiction of
source. However, he concludes that, to reach this correct result, Wynne en-
gages in doctrinal legerdemain. Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Su-
preme Courts Opinion in Wynne, 123 J. TAXN 4, 10 (2015).
2016] THE ENIGMA OF WYNNE 805
opinion largely joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia adhered
to his long-standing position that there is no constitutional foun-
dation for the dormant Commerce Clause.47 Justice Thomas,
largely supported by Justice Scalia, similarly maintained his view
that the dormant Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the 
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually un-
workable in application.48 Justice Ginsburg, in conjunction with
Justices Kagan and Scalia, accepted the existence of the dormant
Commerce Clause but argued that nothing in the Constitution 
or in prior decisions of this Court requires the Maryland county 
income tax to grant a credit to the Wynnes for the out-of-state
income taxes that they pay.49
II. DISCUSSION
A. Wynnes Tariff Analogy Is Powerful and Limitless 
The tariff analogy, central to Justice Alitos Wynne opinion, is
both powerful and limitless: Justice Alito is correct that state-
imposed tariffs are the quintessential evil against which the dor-
mant Commerce Clause is aimed. The problem is that, in the
modern world, everything state and local governments do creates
a tariff-like effect, potentially creating powerful incentive[s]50
for a resident to invest at home rather than out of state. The tar-
iff analogy, critical to Wynne, thus perpetuates the fundamental
incoherence of the dormant Commerce Clause concept of nondis-
crimination. That concept arbitrarily labels some tax policies as
unconstitutionally discriminatory because they encourage in-state
investment while apparently permitting other economically equiv-
alent tax and nontax policies that similarly encourage intrastate
economic activity.
Suppose, for example, that Howard County exercises its au-
thority to lower its general county income tax rate. This lower tax
47 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180910 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Attorney Jasper L. 
Cummings, Jr. concludes that the three dissenting opinions in Wynne are all 
compelling. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., InternalConsistencyand the Federal
Income Tax, 77 ST. TAX NOTES 185, 186 (2015).
48 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49 Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 180102 (majority opinion). 
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rate encourages the Wynnes to invest at home rather than deploy
their resources out of state. This rate reduction is tantamount 
to a tariff 51 as Howard County thereby uses its tax authority to
create a powerful incentive52 to retain the Wynnes investments 
at home. Alternatively, suppose that Maryland provides a low-
interest loan to the Wynnes corporation to build a Maryland fa-
cility. Suppose further that this loan contains an increasingly
common clawback feature under which the corporation must
repay Marylands largesse if the corporation moves its facility to 
another state.53 These policies are similarly tantamount to a 
tariff,54 rewarding the Wynnes and their corporation for invest-
ing and remaining in Maryland, or penalizing them for moving
resources out of state.
The list goes on and, indeed, encompasses virtually all taxes
and public services. Assume that, as part of the package of incen-
tives for the Wynnes corporation to build a plant in Maryland, 
Howard County and Maryland promise to construct new roads
to the plant and also commit to provide state-subsidized job train-
ing for new employees at the plant. These incentives are designed
to (figuratively speaking) construct walls (or moats) around
Maryland to keep resources in-state.
As Justice Alito notes, better schools help employers to attract
and retain employees.55 The same is also true of good police and
fire services. Everything the modern state or municipality does
is tantamount to a tariff,56 potentially creating powerful in-
centive[s]57 for employers and investors to move or stay to receive
such services. There is a broad consensus among tax experts that
tax policies and direct expenditures are interchangeable; tax
subsidies can be reformulated as direct outlay programs and vice
51 Id. at 180607. 
52 Id. at 180102. 
53 See, e.g., Randle B. Pollard, Was the Deal Worth it?: The Dilemma of 
States with Ineffective EconomicIncentives Programs, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
1, 21, 26 (2015) (States will frequently include clawback or recapture lan-
guage in the contractual agreements that provide the incentives.). 
54 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180607. 
55 Id. at 1797.
56 Id. at 180607. 
57 Id. at 180102. 
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versa.58 Consequently, if some tax provisions that encourage in-
state investment are deemed to be unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory because of their tariff-like effects, so too all economically
equivalent direct expenditure programs must also run afoul of
the dormant Commerce Clause because of their identical, tariff-
like effects.
In short, the tariff analogy is powerful in its imagery and
limitless in its implications. It is unlikely that the five justices
who comprise the Wynne majority believe that the dormant Com-
merce Clause precludes states and localities from improving their
routine public services or from lowering their tax rates to attract
and retain employers and residents. This Author similarly sus-
pects that these justices would recoil from the prospect that the
courts, under the rubric of dormant Commerce Clause nondis-
crimination, should police conventional public services for their
impact on interstate commerce.
However, the tariff analogy has no convincing limiting princi-
ple. If failing to grant a tax credit is unconstitutionally tanta-
mount to a tariff59 because of the powerful incentive60 thereby
created to invest at home, so too other routine tax and nontax pol-
icies and services which similarly encourage in-state investments
are also unconstitutional because of their tariff-like effects. It is
arbitrary to label as unconstitutionally discriminatory Marylands 
failure to grant the Wynnes a county income tax credit for out-of-
state income taxes while treating as constitutional the remaining
universe of tax and nontax policies which are economically equiv-
alent in their potential to induce in-state investment.
The problem is not a failure of skill or effort. The craftsmanship
and energy with which Wynne was constructed are evident as is
the equally fine scholarship of the commentators who have la-
bored unsuccessfully to bring coherence to the concept of dormant
58 This consensus has largely been forged under the heading of tax expen-
diture analysis. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Counterproductive Nature ofTax
Expenditure Budgets, 137 TAX NOTES 1317, 131819 (2012) (summarizing tax 
expenditure analysis); Edward A. Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of
Constitutionalizing TaxExpenditure Analysis, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 2629 
(2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/994_mx3arnp9.pdf [https://perma
.cc/J58C-2674].
59 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180607. 
60 Id. at 180102. 
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Commerce Clause nondiscrimination.61 The intractable quandary
is that, in the modern state with its plethora of services and tax
policies, the dormant Commerce Clause concept of nondiscrimi-
nation, despite its intuitive appeal and past service, is inherently
incoherent. That concept randomly condemns some state tax pol-
icies as unconstitutional because they encourage in-state invest-
ment while giving a free pass to economically equivalent tax and
nontax policies that similarly encourage in-state economic activity.
Wynnes aggressive invocation of the tariff analogy perpetuates, 
rather than solves, this problem.
B. The DeathofExternalConsistency?
A defender of Wynne might retort that state and local tax and
nontax policies, despite their tariff-like effects, pass constitu-
tional muster under the internal consistency test. If every state
offered the same tax rates, the same loan subsidies with identi-
cal clawback features, the same roads and job training, and the
same police, education, and fire services, the Wynnes and their S-
corporation would have no incentive to invest in Maryland rather
than in any other state. In the theoretical world of internal con-
sistency, all state policies are identical.
This retort would highlight an enigmatic omission by the
Wynne Court: the Courts silence62 on the subject of external
61 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Essay, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause
Expendable?A Response to EdwardZelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623 (2007); Brannon
P. Denning, Rebuttal, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Mend It, Dont 
End It, 155 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 202 (2007), https://www.pennlawreview
.com/debates/index.php?id=7 [https://perma.cc/5UGL-7LMW]; Walter Hellerstein
& Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development
Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996). For this Authors contrary views, 
see Edward A. Zelinsky, Essay, The Incoherence ofDormant Commerce Clause
Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J. 653 (2007);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 ST. TAX NOTES 941 (2007);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Debate, The Time Has Come to Abolish the Dormant
Commerce Clause Prohibition on DiscriminatoryTaxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 196 (2007), https://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.php?id=7
[https://perma.cc/5UGL-7LMW].
62 Wynne does acknowledge that Marylands Court of Appeals applied the 
external consistency test. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793. After that single reference,
however, Wynne makes no mention of external consistency. Id.
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consistency. At one level, this silence is understandable. Once
the Wynne Court declared that the creditless Maryland county
income tax flunks the dormant Commerce Clause test of inter-
nal consistency, there was no need to subject that tax further to
the test of external consistency. At another level, however, the
Courts silence on the subject of external consistency leaves a
puzzling gap in the Courts articulation of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.
Container Corp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Board intro-
duced the twin tests of internal consistency and external con-
sistency as a conjoined pair.63 The test of internal consistency
postulates a hypothetical world in which a challenged law is ap-
plied by every jurisdiction.64 The complementary test of external
consistency is a more difficult requirement and asks whether 
the challenged tax law actually reflect[s] a reasonable sense of
how income is generated.65 In effect, the external consistency 
test is essentially a practical inquiry.66
If we ask how tax rate reductions, industrial development
subsidies, clawback provisions, and routine government activities
such as police, fire, and education services actually work, they are
all tantamount to tariffs in their practical impacts. They all po-
tentially cause resources to be invested in-state rather than out-
of-state. If the practical inquiry67 of external consistency retains
its substance in light of Wynne, that inquiry suggests that the
powerful but boundless label tantamount to a tariff68 applies to
all tax and nontax policies pursued by states and localities. All
such policies can, like a tariff, in practice bias the interstate
playing field to attract and retain resources within the state that
pursues such policies.
On the other hand, Wynnes silence on the test of external con-
sistency may reflect judicial discomfort with that test.69 Justice
Alitos Wynne opinion can be read as presaging a future formal
63 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264 (1989).
67 Id.
68 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 180607 
(2015).
69 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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repudiation of the external consistency test. While internally in-
consistent taxes are typically unconstitutional,70 that is not
true of tax schemes that create disparate incentives to engage in 
interstate commerce (and sometimes result in double taxation)
only as a result of the interaction of two different but nondiscrim-
inatory and internally consistent schemes.71
The category of internally consistent [tax] schemes72 is where
the external consistency test plays a role, looking at the practical
consequences of taxes that pass the theoretical test of internal
consistency. Justice Alitos opinion indicates that these tax laws, 
because they pass the hurdle of internal consistency, are typi-
cally [not] unconstitutional.73
If Wynne thereby signals judicial disenchantment with the
external consistency test, Wynne portends a dramatic reduction of
scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause as internal con-
sistency is to be the end of the inquiry, which previously contin-
ued to the practical test of external consistency. If, on the other
hand, Wynne leaves external consistency intact, Wynnes robust 
embrace of the tariff metaphor implies that nothing states and
localities do is beyond the judiciarys dormant Commerce Clause 
supervision because state and municipal policies in practice are
tantamount to tariffs, encouraging in-state investment and eco-
nomic activity.
Thus, paradoxically and enigmatically, Wynne may either re-
strict the dormant Commerce Clause by jettisoning the practical
test of external consistency, or broaden the test because all state
and local tax and nontax policies are potentially tantamount to
tariffs in their practical economic effects.
C. The DeathofApportionment?
A further quandary raised by the Courts enigmatic decision 
in Wynne is that internal consistency is a test of apportionment.
However, Wynne uses that test to condemn the Maryland county
tax, not for failing to apportion, but for discriminating against
70 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802.
71 Id. (parentheses in original).
72 Id.
73 Id.
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out-of-state activity. This implies either that the scope of the in-
ternal consistency test has been broadened to reach issues of dis-
crimination or that the Court is collapsing discrimination and
apportionment into a single dormant Commerce Clause concept.
Wynne acknowledges the much-cited four-part test articulated
in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady.74 Under this test, a state tax
survives under the dormant Commerce Clause if the tax is ap-
plied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.75
Until Wynne, internal consistency has been a test of fair ap-
portionment.76 CentralGreyhound has been understood as a case
about Complete Autos apportionment test.77 This is also the most
natural reading of CentralGreyhound, in which the Court opined
that New Yorks gross receipts tax imposed on a bus company 
should be apportioned based on the ratio of buses in-state and 
out-of-state mileage.78 CentralGreyhound did not declare the
New York gross receipts tax to be discriminatory, but instead re-
quired the tax to be fairly apportioned.79 Similarly, the Court
twice described the Indiana tax struck in J.D. Adams as levied
without apportionment.80
However, Wynne invokes internal consistency, CentralGrey-
hound, and J.D. Adams to condemn the creditless Maryland
74 Id. at 1793 (citing 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
75 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. For more on Complete Auto, see Edward
A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 6, 10, 24 (2008).
76 See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989) ([W]e determine whether 
a tax is fairly apportioned by examining whether it is internally and externally
consistent.); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 
(1983) (discussing internal and external consistency as component[s] of fair-
ness in an apportionment formula). 
77 See Okla. Tax Commn v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 186, 190 
(1995) (discussing CentralGreyhoundas a matter of apportionment); Goldberg,
488 U.S. at 264.
78 See Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 66263 (1948). 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
80 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311, 314 (1938). Gwin,
White states that the Washington state business activities tax in its practical 
operation discriminates against interstate commerce. Gwin, White & Prince, 
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939). However, the opinion also states
that the tax is not apportioned to [the taxpayers] activities within the state. Id.
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county income tax as unconstitutionally discriminatory, not as
improperly apportioned. Again, this leaves us reading tea leaves.
Is Wynne now suggesting that discrimination and apportionment
are the same dormant Commerce Clause inquiries? If so, that
would be a radical transformation of the Complete Auto formula
that treats apportionment and discrimination as independent,
separate hurdles, both of which must be surmounted for a tax to
survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. If not, it is perplex-
ing that the Wynne Court, by deploying the internal consistency
test, struck down the creditless Maryland county income tax as
malapportioned without explicitly saying so.
D. Abandoning Source-BasedNonresident Taxation as an
Alternative to Credits
As noted, Justice Alitos Wynne opinion indicates that Mary-
land can satisfy the test of internal consistency by means other
than granting a credit to residents for their out-of-state taxes.81
It is, however, Justice Ginsburgs dissent that outlines the alter-
native by which Maryland can salvage its creditless county in-
come tax as a matter of internal consistency: repeal the county
tax for nonresidents on their Maryland source income.82
Suppose that Maryland embraced this alternative approach,
retaining for its residents a state income tax that grants a credit
for out-of-state income taxes while also retaining for Maryland
residents a county income tax without a credit for out-of-state
taxes. As part of this approach, Maryland would abolish the
county income tax, but keep the state income tax, for nonresidents
who earn income in Maryland. The test of internal consistency
hypothesizes that every other state will pursue this approach as
well. If so, in this theoretical world, the Wynnes would pay the same
total state and county income tax on their in-state investments in
Maryland as they would pay on their out-of-state investments.
To illustrate this, consider the following example under this
hypothetical regime. Suppose that Maryland assesses state in-
come tax at a rate of 5 percent, payable both by residents on their
worldwide incomes and by nonresidents on their incomes derived
81 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806 (2015).
82 Id. at 182223 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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from Maryland sources. Every other state adopts an equivalent
state income tax, taxing their respective residents on their global
incomes at a rate of 5 percent while taxing nonresidents at that
rate on in-state income. Suppose further that Maryland and every
other state also levies a county income tax at the rate of 1 per-
cent, payable only by residents on their respective global incomes.
Assume also that Maryland (and every other state) grants a credit
to residents against state (but not county) income taxes for the
out-of-state income taxes those residents pay. To complete the
example, assume that the Wynnes can make an investment in
Maryland which will generate one hundred dollars or that they
can invest in State X to earn that same one hundred dollars.
If the Wynnes, as Maryland residents, make the in-state in-
vestment in this theoretical world, they will pay a total income
tax of six dollars: a five-dollar state income tax to Maryland plus
a one-dollar Maryland county income tax. If the Wynnes instead
earn these one hundred dollars in State X, under Xs hypothe-
sized tax system mirroring Marylands tax regime, the Wynnes 
again pay six dollars in tax. In particular, they would pay a five-
dollar state income tax to X which would be fully credited against,
and thus completely offset, the Wynnes five dollar state income 
tax liability as Maryland residents. The Wynnes would pay no
county income tax in State X because there is no county income
tax on nonresidents in Maryland or in X. Finally, the Wynnes, as
Maryland residents, would pay a one-dollar county income tax in
Maryland. The upshot again is six dollars in income tax; namely,
five dollars to state X and one dollar to the Maryland county in
which the Wynnes reside.
Thus, the Wynnes havein this theoretical worldno tax in-
centive to invest in Maryland rather than in State X. Either way,
the Wynnes total tax burden83 will be six dollars in combined
state and local income taxes.
In the context of international income taxation, systems that
tax solely on the basis of residence are often characterized as
capital export neutral.84 If no tax is payable to the nation in
83 Id. at 1805.
84 REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 28183 (3d ed. 2011); CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF
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which a nonresident earns income, an individual will pay the
same single tax to his nation of residence wherever he earns that
income. Hence, taxes play no role in the individuals decision 
whether to invest at home or abroad since he will pay the same
income tax to his nation of residence either way.
In a similar vein, Wynne indicates that there is no tariff-like
bias for in-state investment if a state or locality taxes its residents
on their worldwide incomes, forsakes taxation of nonresidents on
the income they earn within the state or locality, and grants no
credit for taxes paid to other jurisdictions. If such a system were
adopted universally, a resident would pay the same state and
local income taxes whether she invests at home or out-of-state.
New York City implements this approach under that citys 
municipal income tax, which applies to residents but not to non-
residents.85 Under the test of internal consistency as explicated
by Wynne, New York City need not offer its residents a credit for
out-of-state income taxes because New York City obtains internal
consistency by not taxing nonresidents on their income earned in
the city. The New York City tax is thus capital export neutral 
and passes constitutional muster under Wynne.86
Wynne consequently offers states and localities two choices to
comply with the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause:
either grant credits to residents for the out-of-state income taxes
such residents pay or eschew nonresident income taxation.
E. What KindofCredits Must Be Granted to SatisfyWynne?
What kind of credit must be granted to resident taxpayers if
a state or locality wants to tax nonresidents on their earnings
within the state or locality? Not all credits are alike. A minority
of states, including Maryland,87 grant their residents income tax
credits against any income tax such residents pay out-of-state.88
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 2021 (4th 
ed. 2011).
85 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a) (McKinney 2015).
86 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
87 See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-703(a) (West 2015).
88 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State PersonalIncome Taxes to
Eliminate the Double Taxation ofDualResidents: Thoughts Provoked bythe
ProposedMinnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533, 546 (2014).
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However, most states only grant a credit for out-of-state taxes
levied on income earned within the taxing state.89
To see the importance of this distinction, suppose that the
Wynnes make an investment in Maryland but that State X never-
theless taxes the income from that investment under an extrater-
ritorial use of its taxing authority. Suppose, for example, that the
Wynnes invest in a Maryland casino and that State X asserts that
the Wynnes must pay Xs income tax on their casino-based income 
because residents of State X drive into Maryland to gamble. The
income tax asserted by State X in this context violates Due Process
because this tax reaches extraterritorially beyond Xs borders.90
Nevertheless, some states persistently impose income tax beyond
their respective boundaries despite the limitations constitution-
ally imposed upon them by the Due Process Clause.91
If so, need Maryland grant a credit to the Wynnes for State Xs 
extraterritorial income tax? Today, Maryland is in the minority
of states that grants a credit for any income taxes paid by a resi-
dent to another state without limiting its credit to taxes levied by
89 See id. at 54648. 
90 See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 27273 (1978) (stating 
that, in order to avoid extraterritorial taxation, Due Process requires that the 
income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to
values connected with the taxing State) (citation omitted); Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37, 55 (1920) (explaining that a state may only tax a nonresidents in-
come which actually arises in the state); see also WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET
AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 38691 (10th ed. 2014). 
91 The most important example today of a state taxing beyond its borders
is New Yorks income taxation of nonresidents on days they telecommute from 
their out-of-state homes. For more on New Yorks so-called convenience of the 
employer taxation, see 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN,
ST. TAXN ¶ 20.05[4][e][i] (3d ed. 2015); HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90, at
391402; Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in our Na-
tionalEconomy, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 885, 922 (2008); Nicole Belson Goluboff, Back
in Business with the Multi-State Worker TaxFairness Act, 72 ST. TAX NOTES
101, 102 (Apr. 14, 2014); Nicole Belson Goluboff, State TaxReform: The Mod-
ern Solution to Keep Workers Mobile and Businesses Resilient, TAX MGMT.
WKLY. ST. TAX RPT. 5, 811 (July 18, 2014); William V. Vetter, New Yorks 
Convenience of the Employer Rule Conveniently Collects Cash from Non-
residents, Part 2, 42 ST. TAX NOTES 229, 238 (Oct. 23, 2006). For this Authors 
most recent comments on New Yorks employer convenience rule, see Edward 
A. Zelinsky, Combining the Mobile Workforce and the Telecommuter TaxActs,
65 ST. TAX NOTES 319 (2012).
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the second state on income arising within its own boundaries.92
Does Wynne require such a liberal credit, or could Maryland, like
the majority of states, instead deny its resident a credit for an
out-of-state tax levied on income that does not arise within the
taxing state? Wynne does not say.
The majority rule satisfies the internal consistency test, but
only if the taxing state itself assesses no tax on income arising
outside its boundaries. To see this, let us modify in two respects
the example of the Wynnes investing in a Maryland casino. First,
let us assume that Maryland switches to the majority rule under
which residents receive income tax credits only for out-of-state
taxes paid on income arising within the taxing state. Second, let
us assume that Maryland affirms that it will not assert state
income taxes against a casino located in State X because Mary-
land residents cross the border to gamble there.
Under the internal consistency test, State X is hypothesized
to adopt this approach alsoi.e., an income tax credit for its res-
idents only for taxes paid to another state on income earned within
that state and no extraterritorial taxation of the income of an out-
of-state casino because residents of X cross the border to gamble.
Under these assumptions, the double tax problem disappears be-
cause State X, by assumption, no longer taxes the nonresident
Wynnes on their Maryland casino-based income. Thus, Maryland
need not extend any credit to the Wynnes for State X income taxes
because X no longer taxes the Wynnes income. 
On the other hand, if the practical external consistency test
still retains substance, the answer might be different. If, in prac-
tice, State X taxes the Wynnes on their Maryland casino income,
we have a clash of constitutional principles. Due Process says that
the extraterritorial tax levied by State X is unconstitutional.93
Wynne implies that, in the face of such extraterritorial taxation,
Maryland must grant the Wynnes a credit to avoid tariff-like
double taxation. After Wynne, the Wynnes in this hypothetical
world have a strong Due Process claim against State X to stop its
extraterritorial taxation of their casino-based income earned in
92 MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-703(a) (West 2015).
93 See Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 27273 (1978); Shaffer, 252 U.S. at
55; see also HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90, at 38691. 
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Maryland and a strong dormant Commerce Clause claim that
Maryland must grant them an income tax credit for State Xs 
tax. It is not clear in the face of Wynne how this clash should
be resolved.
F. Wynne and the Double State Income Taxation of
DualResidents
Another important issue impacted by Wynne is the double
taxation of dual residents. The dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine articulated in Wynne undermines the Courts traditional tol-
erance of the double state income taxation of dual residents. Such
double taxation can encourage a dual resident to undertake single-
taxed in-state economic activity rather than make investments
subject to such double taxation.
Wynne does not explicitly address the double state income
taxation of dual residents, as the Wynnes are only residents of
Maryland. Under the heading of domicile, an individual may, for
income tax purposes, be deemed to be a resident of two (or more)
states if both states conclude that it is the individuals perma-
nent home.94 Domicile is a subjective, fact-specific inquiry about 
an individuals relationship to a particular jurisdiction as his per-
manent home. It is possible for the tax collectors in two states 
to look at the same facts and each conclude that an individual is
domiciled in his state.95 When this happens, the individual is
taxed twice as a resident of both states that claim to be the tax-
payers place of domicile. 
Alternatively, for income tax purposes, states have increas-
ingly embraced the concept of statutory residence.96 Under their
statutory residence laws, states assert the right to tax a non-
domiciled individual as a resident based on such factors as the
number of days the individual spends in the state and whether
the individual has a permanent place of abode in the state.97 When
one state claims to be the state of domicile and another state
94 Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 54243. 
95 Id. at 543.
96 See id. at 54346. 
97 See id.
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asserts statutory residence, both states will tax this individual
as a resident on his worldwide income.98
In the context of dual residence, frequently neither state will
grant a credit for some nor all of the taxes paid by the dual resi-
dent to the other state of residence.99 As just observed, most states
grant their residents a credit for another states income taxes 
only if those taxes are imposed on income that arises in that other
taxing state.100 Virtually all states, under the principle of mobilia
sequuntur personam, attribute investment dividends, interest,
and capital gains to themselves as the state of residence.101 In the
context of a dual resident, the result is often double income taxa-
tion as both states assert the right to tax the individuals entire 
worldwide dividend, interest, and capital gain income on the basis
of residence without extending a credit to avoid double taxation.102
A similar problem of double state income taxation arises in the
context of IRA, 401(k), and other pension distributions to dual
residents.103 Under federal law, only a state of residence may tax
such retirement distributions.104 However, if two states claim to
be the distributees state of residence for income tax purposes, 
double state income taxation again occurs as both states tax this
dual residents retirement distributions and neither state pro-
vides a credit for the taxes levied by the other.
In the past, the problem of the double state income taxation
of dual residents was largely a quandary of the ultra-rich.105
However, the problem is moving down the income scale as more
98 See, e.g., Noto v. N.Y. St. Dept of Taxn & Fin., No. 03392/2010, 2014 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 1008, at *11 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 3, 2014) (discussing the double
taxation of a taxpayer domiciled in Connecticut and statutory resident of New
York); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Noto decision and double state income taxation
ofdualresidents, OUPBLOG (June 2, 2014), http://blog.oup.com/2014/06/noto-de
cision-double-state-income-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/G7LR-7DTE].
99 See Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 546.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 548. See, e.g., Ohios codification of mobilia sequuntur personam
stating that [a]ll items of nonbusiness income or deduction taken into account 
in the computation of adjusted gross income for the taxable year by a resident
shall be allocated to this state. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(A) (West 2015).
102 Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 548.
103 See id. at 56061. 
104 4 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012).
105 Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 556.
2016] THE ENIGMA OF WYNNE 819
baby boomers retire and maintain second homes in another state
and as more dual career couples maintain two residences in dif-
ferent states.106 Thus, individuals increasingly find themselves
taxed as residents in two (or more) states because both states
deem themselves to be the individuals state of domicile or be-
cause one state is the state of domicile and another state is a
state of statutory residence.107 In either case, two states will tax
this individual as a resident on his worldwide income, often with
no credit being granted by either state to mitigate the double tax-
ation of investment income.108
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that double taxation
from dual residence raises no constitutional issue.109 Wynne chal-
lenges that traditional understanding, as the double state income
taxation of a dual resident can be, in Justice Alitos words, tanta-
mount to a tariff,110 creating a powerful incentive111 for the dual
resident to keep his capital at home to avoid double taxation.
Suppose, for example, that a dual resident is domiciled in New
York and is a statutory resident of California, where she main-
tains a second home. Both states would tax this dual resident on
her worldwide income. Each state, under the principle of mobilia
sequuntur personam, would attribute to itself this individuals 
investment income from dividends, interest, and capital gains.
While both states would grant a credit for income taxes assessed
on business income earned in the other state, neither state would
grant a credit to abate the double state income taxation of such
individuals investment income from dividends, interest, and cap-
ital gains.
Suppose further that this dual resident must decide whether
to put one hundred dollars into a New York business or to invest
that same one hundred dollars in stocks and bonds. California
would grant this dual resident a credit against its income tax for
106 Id.
107 An individual can also be a dual resident because she triggers the statu-
tory residence requirements in two or more states. Id. at 546.
108 See id.
109 Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (citing Worcester Cnty. Trust Co. v.
Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937)).
110 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806
07 (2015).
111 Id. at 180102. 
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New York income taxes levied against New York business in-
come. However, California would not grant a credit against its
income tax for the New York income taxes assessed against the
dividends, interest, and capital gains arising from the dual resi-
dents investments in stocks and bonds because California would 
attribute that investment income to itself. The resulting double
state income taxation to which this dual resident is subject acts
as a tariff which, in this example, induces her to keep her money at
home in a New York business rather than investing in stocks and
bonds, the earnings of which are income taxed by both states.112
By placing her money in a New York business, this dual resi-
dent would be subject only to New York income taxes because
California gives a credit against state taxes levied on business in-
come earned in another state. If the dual resident instead uses her
money to buy investment stocks and bonds, she will be subject to
double taxation as a dual resident because, under the principle of
mobilia sequuntur personam, both New York and California would
tax the dividends, interest, and capital gains generated by these
investments without providing any credit to abate double taxa-
tion. The same bias for in-state business activity would occur if
this dual resident were choosing between single-taxed business
income earned by a California business or double-taxed dividends,
interest, and capital gains from investment stocks and bonds.
According to the Wynne Court, this kind of de facto tariff vio-
lates the dormant Commerce Clause by creating a powerful in-
centive for the dual resident to conduct in-state business in order
to pay less state income tax. Wynne thus undermines the Courts 
traditional refusal to view the double taxation of dual residents
as unconstitutional. The potential double taxation of dual resi-
dents can be tariff-like in its effects when the prospect of such
double taxation encourages single-taxed business activity within
the state rather than double state-taxed investments.
CONCLUSION
Wynne is an important and enigmatic decision with implica-
tions extending well beyond the particular facts of that case. The
five-justice Wynne majority made a major statement about the
112 Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 54849. 
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dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne perpetuates an inherent prob-
lem of the Courts dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the Court 
declares some ill-defined taxes as unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory because they encourage in-state economic activity, while other
economically equivalent taxes and government programswhich 
also encourage intrastate investmentare apparently acceptable 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Wynne raises as many questions as it answers. Among these
are the continuing viability (or not) of external consistency and
apportionment, concepts that have been central to the Courts 
formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne also un-
dermines the Courts traditional tolerance of the double state 
income taxation of dual residents because such double taxation
can encourage a dual resident to undertake single-taxed in-state
economic activity rather than make investments subject to such
double taxation.

